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1  Introduction1 
“There is no means of avoiding the final collapse of a boom brought 
about by credit expansion. The alternative is only whether the crisis 
should come sooner as the result of a voluntary abandonment of 
further credit expansion, or later as a final and total catastrophe of 
the currency system involved.” 
             (Ludwig von Mises, 1949, p. 570)  
 
 
If there is one thing that, over time, turned out to be indisputable is that a marked-based 
economic system, beyond enhancing economic growth and standards of living around 
the world, has historically been subject to speculative bubbles, i.e., rising asset prices 
generating overly high expectations of further price rises, which are not warranted by 
fundamental factors. Starting from the late 1970s, credit and asset price fluctuations 
have grown in amplitude, becoming the major drivers of business cycles in both 
advanced and emerging market economies. These fluctuations have been further 
accelerated by the progressive adoption by many central banks around the world of a 
new framework for monetary policy – inflation targeting as from the end of the 1980s. 
By considering medium-run price stability as the overriding goal of monetary policy, 
inflation targeting regimes have come to neglect (or rather, have supported the 
formation of) financial imbalances on credit and asset markets, whose build-up occurred 
alongside price stability, as measured on the market for produced goods and services. In 
other words, inflation targeting central banks have become victims of their own success, 
insofar as the credibility they earned by taming inflationary pressures was obtained to 
the detriment of financial stability over longer time horizons. Accordingly, up to the 
2007-8 financial crisis, a low and stable inflation rate coexisted with highly procyclical 
credit and asset price developments. Against this background, price stability was 
identified by the dominant New Keynesian paradigm as a necessary and sufficient 
precondition in the quest of preserving financial stability. 
 
The severity with which the 2007-8 financial crisis spread to the whole economy 
towards the end of 2008 reopened the time-honored debate about whether monetary 
policy should actively lean against emerging financial imbalances, so as to counteract 
the excessive optimism prevailing on credit and asset markets during economic booms 
and reduce the probability (and the severity) of a potential crisis. After the financial 
crisis exploded in 2007, a growing number of economists (see, among others, Kohn, 
2008; Yellen, 2009) within the academia revised their ideological commitments and 
challenged the canonical New Keynesian monetary paradigm – embracing the belief 
that monetary policy could and should be used to prevent overly credit growth and 
soaring asset prices. In this paper, we argue that the main policy instrument now at the 
disposal of central banks, the short-run interest rate, remains an unavailing tool to deal 
with system-wide financial imbalances – not least owing to welfare losses arising from 
the sharp policy tightening needed to counteract credit and asset price dynamics. 
                                                            
1 We would like to thank Sergio Rossi for his comments and suggestions; all remaining errors are our 
own. 
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Nonetheless, the apparent bluntness of the short-run interest-rate instrument should not 
relieve central banks of any responsibility in the quest for financial stability. Macro-
prudential tools are, against this background, better suited to address unsustainable 
credit dynamics, whose build-up lies at the heart of excessive asset swings and financial 
crises eventually. In addition, a counter-cyclical tax on debt addressing overall credit 
growth properly could complete the deficiencies of macro-prudential regulation. 
 
The next section discusses the evolution and the rationale underlying the establishment 
of inflation-targeting regimes in advanced and emerging market economies, arguing that 
the achievement of a low and stable inflation rate is necessary but insufficient today to 
achieve financial stability. In light of the 2007-8 financial crisis, section 3 reviews the 
arguments underpinning the debate on whether central banks should react or not to 
unsustainable credit dynamics and/or misaligned asset prices. Section 4 offers policy 
considerations, arguing that the central banks’ toolkit should be complemented by a 
number of macro-prudential tools. Additionally, a counter-cyclical tax on debt that 
internalises the negative externalities propelled by excessive debt expansion during 
periods of economic stability should be implemented. Section 5 concludes briefly. 
 
 
2 Inflation targeting and the ‘paradox of credibility’ 
 
In the late 1960s, but increasingly in the 1970s, major industrial economies were 
plagued with the spectre of high and variable rates of inflation, often reaching the 
double-digit mark. Besides the 1973-4 and 1979-80 oil shocks, inflationary pressures in 
industrial economies were caused by a misconception of the nature and the role of 
money in spawning inflation dynamics. Consistently with Keynesian philosophy, policy 
makers in industrial economies pursued activist monetary policies (so-called ‘stop-go’) 
aimed at keeping output growth close to its full employment level. The belief in the 
existence of a permanent, stable long-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment 
(known as Phillips curve) allowed monetary authorities to actively manage aggregate 
demand to attain a lower rate of unemployment, in exchange for a lower rate of inflation 
(Bernanke et al., 2001, p. 11). With the benefit of hindsight, the excessive activism of 
monetary authorities in an attempt to curb short-run economic fluctuations proved to be 
disastrous for macroeconomic stability, generating serious inflationary outbreaks. By 
then, as Borio and White (2004, p. 1) point out correctly in this regard, inflation has 
been “the great villain” for much of the post-war period. 
 
The positive side of these macroeconomic failures was the emergence of consciousness 
that such policy mistakes should not be repeated in the future (Issing, 2008). In the late 
1970s, a growing number of economists recognised the potential costs of inflation in 
terms of economic growth, acknowledging at the same time the various benefits of 
preserving price stability. These theoretical developments underpinned the incredible 
disinflationary process implemented in 1979 by Paul Volcker, the then Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve System. By imposing severe limitations on the growth of monetary and 
credit aggregates, Volcker brought down US inflation rates and stabilised (and 
anchored) inflation expectations, thus contributing to a prolonged period of economic 
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prosperity that lasted until the end of the second millennium. Owing to the success of 
the US experiment, as well as the gradual demise of monetary targeting regimes,2 the 
late 1980s witnessed a common trend both in advanced and emerging market economies 
towards the adoption of a new framework for monetary policy, known as inflation 
targeting.3  
 
As Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), Mishkin (2001/2002), and Arestis and Sawyer (2003) 
observe, an inflation targeting strategy is characterised by the announcement of 
medium-run official target ranges for the inflation rate, and by explicitly acknowledging 
that price stability is the overriding, long-run goal of monetary policy. The key rationale 
underlying the adoption of inflation targeting dates back to early influential monetarist 
writings. Indeed, Friedman (1963, p. 17) derives from the quantity theory of money that 
“inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon”. Accordingly, no long-
run trade-off exists between inflation and unemployment. Albeit not leaving out the 
possibility that monetary policy may in the short-run affect real variables such as the 
unemployment rate or the rate of output growth, Friedman (1963) concludes that any 
expansionary attempt to boost economic growth in the long run will solely impact the 
inflation rate, leaving the level of economic activity unaffected. 
 
Another rationale underpinning inflation targeting is closely related to the uncertain 
duration of the lags involved in the monetary policy transmission mechanism. These 
long and variable lags could make any discretionary attempt to manage aggregate 
demand doubtful at best, questioning the credibility of the central bank (Friedman, 
1960; Palley, 2004). The latter argument is even reinforced to the extent that 
opportunistic monetary authorities are by nature prone to adopt a short-sighted view on 
public policy issues – altering monetary policy at their discretion to achieve policy goals 
(giving rise thereby to the ‘time-inconsistency problem’; see Bernanke et al., 2001). Not 
surprisingly, Bernanke and Mishkin (1997, p. 104) characterise inflation targeting as a 
regime that subjugates central banks to “constrained discretion”, that is, constraining 
their opportunistic behaviour but entrusting them with a somewhat high degree of 
flexibility to deal with temporary economic shocks. 
 
These powerful arguments supported the nowadays widely-held view that monetary 
policy should be implemented exclusively to achieve medium-run price stability. 
Accordingly, over the past twenty years, delivering price stability has been identified as 
the best contribution that monetary policy could make to overall economic growth and 
financial stability. The benchmark version of the New Keynesian model (see Clarida et 
                                                            
2 A monetary targeting strategy targets the growth rate of a chosen monetary aggregate. This strategy was 
abandoned in the late 1980s, when instability in the demand for money (owing to financial liberalisation 
and deregulation) broke the statistical relationship between monetary aggregates, output, and inflation 
(Palley, 2003; Borio and White, 2004). The demise of monetary targeting led many central banks to 
overlook the evolution of monetary aggregates and their counterparts (above all credit) as an indicator for 
monetary policy (Issing, 2011). The neglect of money and credit developments is also a peculiarity of the 
current state-of-the-art in mainstream economics (the New Keynesian model). 
3 For the course of our analysis, we do not discriminate between ‘strict’ and ‘flexible’ inflation targeting 
regimes, the latter designing a monetary policy background against which central banks, alongside 
promoting price stability, also aim at promoting output growth close to its potential level. 
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al., 1999) supports this view, showing that those central banks that achieve price 
stability are simultaneously delivering a zero output gap – a condition identified by the 
mainstream economic theory as a ‘divine coincidence’ (Blanchard et al., 2010). 
 
The adoption of inflation targeting has allowed both advanced and emerging market 
economies to achieve low inflation rates (Figure 1). Several authors dub this remarkable 
decline in the volatility of both inflation and output growth “the Great Moderation” (see 
Stock and Watson, 2003; Bernanke, 2004). As King (2002) argues, during the Great 
Moderation inflation rates have been lower, more stable, and less persistent than in the 
decades before the adoption of inflation targeting.4 By the same token, as Figure 2 
shows, the 2007-8 financial crisis reversed this downtrend, increasing the volatility of 
both output growth and inflation rates quite dramatically. 
 
Figure 1 The steady decline of inflation rates in some major advanced market 
economies from 1958 to 2008 
 
 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2010, p. 41) 
 
To date, the success of inflation targeting is testified by the fact that, to our knowledge, 
no country having adopted this regime has ever been forced (or willing) to abandon it. 
Contrarily, owing to its supposed benefits, inflation targeting has grown in popularity 
among a large number of emerging market economies, like Brazil or South Korea, 
whose primary goal has been to stabilise domestic inflation rates in a way not to put 
productive capital inflows at stake. 
 
 
                                                            
4 In addition, Rose (2006; 2007) finds evidence that inflation targeting also reduced exchange rate 
volatility, without impairing capital inflows. Contrastingly, Ball and Sheridan (2003) find no evidence 
that inflation targeting improved economic performance, as measured by inflation, output, and interest 
rates. 
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Figure 2 The shift of the volatility of output growth and inflation from 1999-2007 
to 1999-2010 
 
 
Source: Fahr et al. (2011, p. 50) 
 
In the run-up to the 2007-8 financial crisis, however, inflation targeting regimes have 
gradually come under increasing criticism, for a number of reasons. First, albeit 
inflation targeting has undoubtedly contributed to tame inflation, some authors point out 
that the disinflation process was achieved at a high sacrifice ratio in terms of output and 
employment losses (see, for instance, Debelle and Fischer, 1994). Secondly, the 
question arises as to whether the Great Moderation should be considered as a by-
product of the improvement in the conduct of monetary policy (that is, central banks 
being more averse to inflation), or rather as the benign confluence of exogenous factors, 
themselves contributing to subdue inflationary pressures. Finally, but in our view the 
most important shortcoming in light of the 2007-10 episodes of system-wide financial 
instability, inflation targeting did not prevent (rather abetted) the gradual build-up of 
financial imbalances, the latter culminating periodically in financial crises, whose 
macroeconomic costs have been extraordinary high in both advanced and emerging 
market economies.5 
 
The latter shortcoming is based upon the belief that the conjunction of financial 
liberalisation with a monetary policy solely oriented at stabilising (output and) medium-
run inflationary pressures has slightly modified the dynamics of market-based economic 
systems, amplifying boom and bust cycles on asset markets, as well as the scope for 
financial imbalances to develop during the expansionary phase of the business cycle 
                                                            
5 The term ‘imbalance’ defines here the evolution of a variable over a period of time, which tends 
progressively to deviate from its long-run trend in a way to jeopardise financial stability as it unwinds 
(that is, when a ‘mean reversion’ occurs). 
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(Borio and White, 2004). To put it differently, the decline in the variability of both 
output growth and inflation rates achieved following the establishment of credible 
inflation targeting regimes may have lulled policy makers and market participants into a 
false sense of security, generating overly optimistic assessments about the economic 
outlook. Against this background, central banks have become victims of their own 
success, to the extent that their commitment to fight inflation has given rise to the so-
called ‘paradox of credibility’ (Borio and Lowe, 2002; Borio and White, 2004). This 
paradox points out that the pursuit of a credible anti-inflation policy, as has been the 
case of a growing number of central banks as from the 1990s, is a double-edged sword, 
insofar as delivering price stability may lead to unwelcome side effects. As enlightened 
by Borio and White (2004), while on the one hand the hard-won credibility as an 
inflation fighter helps central banks to better anchor long-term inflation expectations 
around an implicit or explicit target – allowing them to better neutralise the real effects 
of an adverse supply shock – on the other hand, a credible price stability-oriented 
monetary policy might unwittingly mask economic risks and support the formation of 
unsustainable asset and credit booms, the latter finding fertile ground in an environment 
of remarkably quiescent inflation rates, as measured on the product market. Then, when 
the ‘irrational exuberance’ driving up credit growth and asset prices vanishes, financial 
imbalances unwind in a disruptive manner, increasing both the depth of the financial 
crisis and the risk of a debt-deflation process eventually. 
 
According to this view (hereinafter referred to as the ‘new environment view’), which 
gained prominence in the 1980s as financial instability became the main policy 
challenge, business cycles are an endogenous process6 whose key driving forces are 
swings in the perception of, and appetite for, risk (see Borio et al., 2003; Borio 2005). 
More precisely, the distinguishing feature of endogenous business cycles is the potential 
for fluctuations in economic activity to be driven by self-reinforcing financial 
developments that arise in conjunction with both positive supply shocks and a monetary 
regime solely hinged on promoting price stability on the market for produced goods and 
services. If these financial developments are allowed to self-reinforce without being 
properly counteracted by a reversal of the macroeconomic policy stance – be it through 
a less accommodative monetary policy or a strengthened macro-prudential framework – 
they may breed waves of excessive optimism and set off unsustainable asset booms 
(Crockett, 2003; Borio and White, 2004). This latter argument is even reinforced to the 
extent that, during economic upturns, unsustainable credit and asset price dynamics may 
be coupled with price stability, as measured on the market for produced goods and 
services. If that is the case, the accumulation of financial imbalances is not correctly 
appraised in the consumer price index (CPI) – the latter index remaining steady low 
                                                            
6 While an ‘exogenous’ shock is triggered by a random (stochastic) supply or demand shock that 
temporarily throws the economy away from its long-run growth path, an ‘endogenous’ shock is a 
deterministic shock whose origin is rooted in a confluence of financial developments, working together 
synergistically (in a procyclical way) within the financial sector so as to amplify the business cycle, both 
in upturns and downturns. For example, loosening credit constraints because of a muted risk perception 
by both lenders and borrowers increase risk-taking and drive up asset prices, whose growth, in turn, 
stimulates further credit expansion. See Spehar (2009) for characterisation of endogenous business cycles. 
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since it includes neither equity nor home prices. Thus, an economy exhibiting a low and 
stable rate of inflation does not give any information about whether monetary policy is 
properly conducted and interest rates are set at an appropriate level (Leijonhufvud, 
2007). Even worse, as Leijonhufvud (2007, p. 1) points out, a central bank keeping to a 
CPI inflation target may pursue policies “that are inimical to financial stability over the 
longer run”. 
 
To sum up, excesses in aggregate demand fueled by the wealth effect induced by 
soaring asset prices are not immediately mirrored in product (goods and services) 
inflation, and financial imbalances build-up against the backdrop of stable prices and 
strong economic activity (Borio and Lowe, 2002). Several factors are likely to explain 
how financial imbalances on credit and asset markets coexist with an environment of 
subdued inflation trends. 
 
•  First, structural factors, such as financial and technological innovation or enhanced 
productivity growth, contribute to dampen inflationary pressures in the product 
market. Expecting inflation rates to decrease, a central bank may be prone to cut its 
policy rate of interest, thus breeding waves of optimism in credit and asset markets 
(Bini Smaghi, 2009; Papademos, 2009). 
 
• Secondly, an economic boom may temporarily reduce labour costs and boost 
business profits, insofar as nominal wages are sticky in the short run and may lag 
the increase in labour productivity. This allows firms to pursue aggressive pricing 
strategies, hence subduing inflationary pressures (Borio et al., 2003). 
 
• Thirdly, insofar as the credibility of monetary authorities in ensuring price stability 
hinges inflation expectations, workers are less likely to adjust their nominal wages 
pretentions upwards. This attenuates the risk of a dangerous self-feeding upward 
spiral between wages and prices. Thus, the belief that inflation no longer represents 
a threat could accelerate the build up of financial imbalances, to the extent that the 
perspective of a recession induced by a monetary tightening is removed (Borio and 
White, 2004). As neatly explained by Crockett (2003), price stability pushes market 
participants to believe in never-ending economic growth, insofar as the quasi-
absence of any inflationary pressures is interpreted as a sign that monetary policy 
will remain accommodative indefinitely. Consequently, both market participants 
and financial institutions could be prompted to construct high-risky portfolios and 
resort to excessive leverage, accepting balance-sheet structures that, over time, 
become highly vulnerable to financial market disturbances, since the ability to serve 
the liabilities borne by the debt eventually relies on the stability of income streams 
and/or the expectation that assets could be sold at a higher price in the future.7 In 
this regard, inflation targeting is deemed to be an insufficient guide for monetary 
policy, insofar as balance-sheet disorders that build up without any immediate 
                                                            
7 Minsky (1982) explains the dynamic whereby a sudden reversal in the interest rate structure (or an 
income shock) reveals the fragility of the financial system after a prolonged economic boom.  
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impact on inflation rates are likely to be overlooked if inflation is the sole target or 
indicator of monetary policy (Palley, 2003; Gnos and Rochon, 2006).8 
 
For all the aforementioned reasons, a low and stable inflation rate on the product market 
could mask rising vulnerabilities within the financial system and give the illusion of a 
strong and stable economic system, lessening market discipline and lulling policy 
makers into inaction. This ‘inertia’ in the policy-making decision process could be 
reflected, for instance, in interest rates being kept too low for too long – central banks 
abetting the build-up of financial imbalances that sow the seeds of their own destruction 
further ahead. Against the backdrop of low interest rates, the subprime crisis 
exemplifies the potential danger to financial stability induced by an excessively loose 
monetary policy, insofar as the crisis can be interpreted as the unravelling of financial 
imbalances that silently accumulated during an extended period of artificially low 
policy rates. 
 
To sum up, two points are worth underlining at this juncture. First, against the 
background of the ‘new environment view’, assessing the stance of monetary policy 
solely in terms of inflation forecasts is both insufficient and misleading, to the extent 
that it may offer a picture of the broader economy which is by far more complacent than 
what is revealed by economic fundamentals. This is even truer insofar as an 
environment characterized by a prevalence of positive supply-side shocks is conducive 
to low inflation rates. Then, a central bank excessively sensitive and averse to 
disinflation may itself be a source of instability, insofar as policy forbearance vis-à-vis 
disinflationary forces fuels financial exuberance, leading in turn to financial imbalances 
(Issing, 2011). This point is even more compelling as the evidence indicates that credit 
and asset booms tend to develop against the background of disinflation. Likewise, 
inflationary pressures do not pick up systematically prior to financial crisis or lending 
booms (Borio and White, 2004). Inflation is therefore a lagged indicator of the business 
cycle (Figure 3). 
 
Secondly, a monetary policy framework promoting low and stable inflation rates fails to 
deliver financial stability as a by-product. In other words, price stability and financial 
stability are not natural bedfellows.9 In this regard, the 2007-8 financial crisis 
challenged the orthodox, conventional wisdom, which claims that a monetary regime 
fostering price stability is automatically attaining other policy objectives, such as 
                                                            
8 Balance-sheet disorders, that is, the tendency to resort to short-term funding to finance excessive debt 
positions, may be further exacerbated if market participants perceive monetary policy as being 
asymmetrical – that is, cushioning the unravelling of financial imbalances in the downturn, but refraining 
from intervening in a timely way when a credit and/or asset price boom threatens to jeopardise the 
stability of the financial system as a whole. 
9 Albeit being extensively used in the literature, the concept of ‘financial stability’ lacks a clear definition 
yet. For the course of our analysis we follow Crockett’s (2003, p. 1) definition, according to which 
financial stability reflects a situation where “the capacity of financial institutions and markets to mobilise 
savings, provide liquidity and allocate investments is maintained unpaired”. Although not fully 
exhaustive, this definition provides at least the advantage of including both the failure of financial 
institutions and the appearance of unsustainable credit and asset price dynamics. See also Allen and 
Wood (2006). 
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maximum sustainable economic growth and financial stability. As a matter of fact, the 
conventional wisdom holds that the best contribution that central banks could offer to 
enhance financial stability is to prevent unanticipated swings in the price level. Ancient 
research work on this subject matter (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999; 2001) supports this 
conventional wisdom, arguing that inflation-targeting central banks should not respond 
directly to asset prices fluctuations, insofar as controlling product inflation stabilises 
asset prices and reduces the frequency of asset price booms. 
 
Figure 3 Inflation rate dynamics around financial crises and lending booms 
 
 
Source: Borio and Lowe (2002, p. 19) 
  Note: the year of the financial crisis is indicated with 0. 
 
Nonetheless, in an environment characterised by financially-driven business cycles 
(consistently with the ideological foundation of the ‘new environment view’), financial 
instability is not so much the result of an unanticipated decline in the price level, as 
measured on the market for produced goods and services, as rather the consequence of a 
decline in asset prices, whose unwinding occurs after a prolonged boom in which 
financial imbalances have been left free to develop (see Borio and Lowe, 2002). 
Further, if the decline in inflation rates is the result of supply-demand dynamics, the 
stability of the financial system is not jeopardised unless the decline of inflation rates is 
accompanied by the unwinding of financial excesses on asset markets. These arguments 
call for central banks to pay more attention to asset prices in the conduct of monetary 
policy, to the extent that, against the backdrop of the ‘new environment view’, a 
monetary policy that keeps inflation rates constant does not necessarily reduce asset 
price fluctuations. 
 
In sum, this section contends that preserving financial stability today requires greater 
vigilance against the build-up of financial imbalances during economic booms, at times 
when central banks foster price stability on the product market. As some economists 
have contended in the recent past (see, e.g., Cecchetti et al., 2000; 2002), this would be 
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tantamount to pretend that, when financial imbalances threaten to emerge against the 
backdrop of economic stability, central banks adopt a somewhat tighter monetary policy 
stance than merely what would be dictated by the macroeconomic outlook (that is, they 
should raise short-run policy rates of interest at the cost of deviating temporarily from 
inflation targets). Then, the success of monetary policy will not be solely measured in 
terms of achieving medium-run price stability and promoting maximum sustainable 
output growth, but through the lens of enhancing financial stability additionally. The 
next section addresses these issues from a central-banking perspective, arguing that, 
despite the necessity of taking into account financial imbalances, monetary policy is 
nowadays not coped with the proper tools to deal with unsustainable credit and asset 
price booms, whose conflagration tests the resilience (and increases the vulnerability) of 
advanced financial systems with increased regularity. 
 
 
3  Asset price bubbles and monetary policy 
 
Free-market capitalism has been the most effective means to support economic growth, 
maximise material well-being, and enhance standards of living around the world. By the 
same token, the history of marked-based economic systems has been marked by 
periodically collapsing speculative bubbles. Greenspan (2011, p. 16) depicts speculative 
bubbles as excessive movements in asset prices “driven by the innate human propensity 
to intermittently swing between euphoria and fear”, whose occurrence has become 
“increasingly independent” of economic activity. Against this background, the housing 
bubble that developed and burst in the US mortgage market over the period 1996-2005, 
in spite of its severity and the high economic costs entailed, was not an isolated 
phenomenon, as rather the climax of a long list of speculative episodes, whose 
amplitude has gradually intensified. Looking back over the previous decades, indeed, 
we observe that, starting from the late 1980s, many advanced and emerging market 
economies have experienced larger credit and asset price fluctuations than in the more 
distant past. As argued in the previous section, these fluctuations were to some extent 
encouraged by the establishment of a credible anti-inflation commitment by central 
banks merely focused on promoting price stability over the medium to long run, to the 
detriment of financial stability over longer time horizons. 
 
From a central-banking perspective, the years up to the 2008 global financial crisis were 
characterised by low and stable worldwide inflation rates, strong economic growth, and 
narrow credit spreads in a variety of financial markets. Against this background, 
“managing monetary policy had become an unexpectedly easy task” during the Great 
Moderation (Gerlach, 2010, p. 1). These golden years of central banking lulled 
economists into thinking that monetary policy had become more of a science over time 
– central banks having succeeded in preserving macroeconomic stability in such a way 
to prevent financial shocks from affecting negatively economic activity. In the United 
States, this belief was further reinforced by the aftermaths of several episodes of 
heightened financial distress, such as the 1987 stock market crash, the debacle of the 
Long Term Capital Management hedge fund or the dotcom bust in 2001. Indeed, in the 
aftermath of these financial shocks, the prompt intervention of the Federal Reserve in 
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support of the national financial system effectively restored investors’ confidence and 
the proper functioning of financial markets. By the same token, these successful 
interventions may have persuaded US policy makers that monetary policy was also well 
equipped to deal with asset price busts, fostering a policy of ‘benign neglect’ with 
respect to asset bubbles (Blanchard et al., 2010). 
 
Major financial crises offer a unique opportunity to redesign the dominant monetary 
policy paradigm and rethink both the mandates and functions of central banks (Stark, 
2011). The 2007-8 financial crisis, beyond representing a hard hit for those policy 
makers who were fallen into the trap of thinking that monetary policy had become as 
boring as dentistry, called into question many of the well-established principles that 
underpinned central banking during the Great Moderation (Mishkin, 2007). Two key 
insights emerged from the 2007-8 crisis with regard to the working of integrated 
financial markets and the conduct of monetary policy. First, financial sector 
developments matter. Albeit their complexity and their ‘pretence of knowledge’, general 
equilibrium macroeconometric models used by central banks prior to the onset of the 
2007-8 financial crisis largely disregarded financial sector developments, leaving out 
from their analysis some key financial elements, such as the financial intermediation 
process or the credit channel, whose disruption turned out to be crucial in amplifying 
the procyclicality of the financial system after the housing bubble burst on the subprime 
mortgage market during the second half of 2006.10 
 
Secondly, asset price bubbles matter. Before the 2008 crisis, central banks were fully 
aware that the bust of a speculative bubble, to wit, asset prices falling back precipitously 
to their fundamental values after having climbed to unsustainable high levels, has often 
been accompanied by a pronounced decline in economic activity (see Kindleberger, 
1978). The decline in economic activity is particularly acute at times when the financial 
accelerator mechanism amplifies the adverse feedback loop between credit and asset 
prices.11 In this respect, the credit and housing bubbles that developed during the first 
decade of the third millennium, lying at the heart of the subprime crisis, challenged the 
conventional wisdom prevailing before that crisis on the relationship between monetary 
policy and asset prices. Likewise, this crisis reopened the old cleavage between those 
who believe that, owing to the growing economic costs of asset bubbles, central banks 
                                                            
10 To be sure, up to the 2006 subprime crisis, financial markets were depicted as a complete, frictionless, 
and welfare-enhancing means of dispersing risks efficiently throughout the economic system 
(International Monetary Fund, 2010). The severity of that crisis underscored the necessity to integrate 
financial frictions and macro-financial linkages in macroeconometric models, in order for monetary 
policy to better understand the working of the financial system and its relationship with the whole 
economy. In this respect, even if still in its infancy, a growing literature (see, among others, Curdia and 
Woodford, 2009; Boissay, 2011; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2011; Gertler and Karadi, 2009) tries to 
incorporate financial sector developments (the ‘periphery’ of macroeconomics) into dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium models (the ‘core’ of macroeconomics). See Caballero (2010) for analytical 
elaboration on this subject matter. 
11 The self-reinforcing positive feedback loop between credit growth and asset prices is a potential source 
of systemic risk, insofar as it seriously affects the balance sheets of financial institutions, especially 
banks. During market downturns, these banks are forced to cut back on lending and to fire-sell their 
leveraged positions in order to satisfy margin calls (and/or capital requirements). See Panzera and Rossi 
(2011). 
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should try to address directly asset price misalignments by tightening monetary policy 
(the ‘activist’ view), and those who argue that central banks should not consider asset 
price misalignments in their own monetary policy decisions, except to the extent that 
misaligned asset prices affect the future path of inflation and output (the ‘conventional’ 
view). Let us take our analysis a step further, before reviewing the main arguments for 
and against policies designed to counteract the emergence of speculative bubbles. 
 
To date, a consensus on whether asset bubbles exist has not emerged in the literature. 
While some economists claim that even the most famous speculative bubble episodes in 
history can be justified by fundamental factors, the modern view recognises the 
existence of asset price bubbles, at least implicitly.12 As a consequence, the key 
question in the literature is not whether asset bubbles exist or not, but rather whether the 
latter require or not a proactive monetary policy attitude. To be sure, until the outbreak 
of the financial turmoil in 2007, the dominant monetary policy consensus was firmly 
grounded in the New Keynesian paradigm (known as ‘Jackson Hole consensus’). This 
paradigm states that central banks should respond to asset price misalignments only to 
the extent that the latter collide with the achievement of the final policy goals, to wit, 
price stability and sustainable output growth. To state it differently, central banks 
should not react to misaligned asset prices, unless when the latter affect the outlook for 
inflation and output over the medium run. This attitude of ‘benign neglect’ with regard 
to asset bubbles can be interpreted as the corollary of a poor understanding of the forces 
driving speculative bubbles as well as the grounded belief that financial developments 
have a limited role to play in the conduct of monetary policy (Kohn, 2006; Bini Smaghi, 
2009). Two arguments underpin the aforementioned pre-crisis consensus. 
 
First, according to Greenspan (1999; 2002; 2010), it is very difficult to recognise the 
existence of a bubble ex ante – that is, before its bursting confirms its existence. 
Likewise, the simple fact for a central bank to recognise the existence of an impending 
bubble is tantamount to pretend that the judgment of “hundreds of thousands of 
informed investors” is wrong, casting serious doubts on investor rationality (Greenspan, 
1999). Moreover, even if the existence and the ability to timely identify bubbles is 
ascertained, policy makers may not be able to discern with reasonable confidence 
between a boom and a bubble. Then, policy makers might erroneously abort an asset 
boom that, in retrospect, turns out to be warranted by economic fundamentals – 
inducing thereby undesirable economic fluctuations.13 
 
                                                            
12 To some extent, this may even seem paradoxical given that central banks are ideologically committed 
to the notion of efficient markets. This neoclassical myth rules out by definition the existence of bubbles, 
since rational and well-informed investors would arbitrage away price inefficiencies, that is, any 
mispricing between the actual and the fundamental value of assets. 
13 Insofar as equity booms are driven by technological advances, aborting an asset boom that, with the 
benefit of hindsight, turns out not be harmful, seriously impairs productivity growth (DeLong, 2002). 
Discerning between an asset boom (justified by fundamentals) and a bubble presupposes the ability to 
determine the fundamental value of an asset, which is a difficult task. In the run-up to the 2000-6 housing 
bubble, for instance, many economic models found that home prices were overvalued (Case and Shiller, 
2003; Gallin, 2004), while other models concluded that, even at the apex of the real-estate bubble, home 
prices were justified by fundamentals (McCarthy and Peach, 2005). 
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Secondly, and by far the most important argument for the course of our analysis, central 
banks are ill-equipped to lean against the build-up of unsustainable asset booms, insofar 
as the main monetary policy tool at their disposal, to wit, the short-run interest rate, is 
too blunt a tool to deal with financial imbalances (Rudebusch, 2005). This argument is 
even reinforced to the extent that financial imbalances are frequently contained within 
specific sectors and the interest rate tool cannot be calibrated across them, but impacts 
the whole economy. Greenspan (2009; 2011) is not acquainted with an episode where 
monetary policy has successfully deflated a bubble – any historical attempt to prick a 
bubble having systematically ended in tears. A number of reasons elucidate the 
‘bluntness’ of the short-run interest rate tool with respect to asset bubbles. 
 
• First of all, if in the eyes of some influential market participants the buoyancy of 
asset markets is going to be sustained for a sufficient period of time, they will 
rationally try to ride the boom as long as possible, trusting in their ability to leave 
the market early enough before the latter goes in reverse eventually. This amounts 
to saying that bubbles can persist over a substantial period of time (see Abreu and 
Brunnermeier, 2003). Likewise, if speculation on asset markets is fed by bank 
credit, a rise in the key policy rates of interest may not be enough to freeze credit 
growth – the banking sector accommodating the surge in the demand for credit as 
the value of collateral rises. Against this background, any restrictive monetary 
policy will not halt speculation, particularly if the bubble reflects a rational 
willingness of both investors and banks to take risks. In the worst-case scenario, if 
the attempt by monetary authorities to curb the bubble turns out to be ineffective, 
speculation may even increase further, insofar as the belief in rising asset prices 
self-validates (see Aglietta and Rigot, 2009; Orlean, 2009, for elaboration on 
perverse dynamics peculiar to asset markets). 
 
• Secondly, the required increase in key policy rates of interest may be so large that it 
will depress the whole economic activity considerably (Assenmacher-Wesche and 
Gerlach, 2008). Boivin et al. (2010) show that a central bank relying on an 
augmented Taylor rule, which responds to credit conditions besides inflation and 
the output gap, needs a sharp policy interest rate increase to stem an unsustainable 
credit boom, thereby undershooting both inflation and output growth targets. 
 
• Thirdly, the presence of long lags between changes in monetary policy and changes 
in macroeconomic conditions complicates the implementation of a timely-
calibrated monetary policy response. Should monetary tightening unfold its effects 
when asset prices have already begun to reverse their course, then the economic 
downturn is further intensified. Hence, if policy makers recognise too late the 
danger of an asset price collapse, monetary easing, rather than tightening, is 
required (Bean et al., 2010). 
 
• Finally, and for the sake of completeness, in an open economy with perfect capital 
mobility, a short-run interest rate hike implemented to resist asset price inflation 
may be counterproductive, to the extent that a higher interest rate feeds a wave of 
capital inflows, part of which could finance speculative transactions. 
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Against this background, owing to the difficulty of leaning against presumed asset 
bubbles, Greenspan (1999) and Bernanke (2002) contend that monetary policy should 
be solely implemented in a manner to clean up the mess after the bubble has burst.14 
The strategy of ‘mopping up’ after the bursting of a bubble requires central banks to 
loosen the monetary policy stance and provide ample liquidity to the financial sector, at 
times when the unwinding of financial imbalances threatens to depress aggregate 
demand and adds undesired deflationary risks. 
 
Having analysed the most compelling arguments in support of the dominant pre-crisis 
paradigm, there seems to be very little room for a more active role of monetary policy in 
pricking asset bubbles. Nonetheless, the severity with which the 2007-8 financial crisis 
spread to the whole economy in 2008, paralysing economic activity all around major 
developed economies, swung the ideological climate with respect to asset bubbles back 
towards a more pragmatic approach. Within academic circles, many economists that 
were heretofore persuaded that monetary policy was too blunt a tool to lean against the 
build-up of financial imbalances recanted their ideological positions after the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in the fall of 2008, which drag many advanced 
economies on the brink of a severe credit crunch (see Kohn, 2006; 2008; and Yellen, 
2005; 2009, for some notable ideological swings). These economists recognise that, in 
some cases at least,15 pricking an incipient asset bubble through an optimal ‘leaning 
against the wind’ (hereinafter referred to as LATW) policy is the optimal solution. 
 
The most exhaustive definition of a LATW policy has been advanced by Trichet (2005). 
He describes it as the propensity of central banks “to cautiously raise interest rates even 
beyond the level necessary to maintain price stability over the short to medium-term 
when a potentially detrimental asset price boom is identified”. Accordingly, the 
rationale underlying LATW policies is the benefit of trading a reduction of economic 
growth today off against the prospect of enhanced financial stability in a more distant 
future. Specifically, a central bank facing the threat of emerging imbalances on credit 
and/or asset markets should raise the policy-controlled short-run interest rate over and 
beyond the level dictated by a Taylor rule that simply aims at stabilising inflation and 
the output gap on a medium-run horizon. This ‘extra action’ should act as a pre-emptive 
insurance policy that contains the build-up of financial imbalances in good times and 
avoids potentially larger economic costs at some point in the future, when financial 
excesses unravel (Lowe, 2005). This suggests that, while in most cases price stability 
                                                            
14 This asymmetrical risk management approach to asset price bubbles arises from two distinctive features 
of the New Keynesian monetary policy paradigm, that is, the disregard for monetary and financial 
developments as well as the underestimation of low-probability tail events (the ‘black swans’). In this 
respect, the 2007-8 financial crisis exemplified that, while ‘black swans’ remain unlikely events, their 
seldom occurrence is likely to jeopardise the stability of the whole economic system in a disruptive 
manner, well beyond the level foreseen by macroeconomic models. 
 
15 Mishkin (2009) divides asset bubbles in two classes, namely, credit driven bubbles (such as the 2000-6 
housing bubble in the United States) and irrational bubbles (like the dotcom bubble). According to the 
same author, the former bubbles deserve special attention by monetary authorities, insofar as they imply 
an easing of lending standards and involve a greater use of leverage. 
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fosters financial stability, in certain circumstances a potential short-run trade-off 
between the two main monetary policy goals (price stability and output growth) and 
financial stability exists.16 To put it differently, the fundamental problem faced by 
inflation-targeting central banks is how they should behave when inflation forecasts 
show downside risks to price stability, while at the same time excessive credit growth 
threatens to fuel unsustainable asset price dynamics, thereby jeopardizing financial 
stability in the near future. 
 
After the 2007-8 global financial crisis, a number of arguments have been pointed out to 
rationalise the necessity to lean against financial imbalances. In this regard, the 
proponents of the ‘activist’ view argue that monetary policy would have been a 
powerful weapon to restrain the US housing bubble in the years preceding the financial 
crisis. Likewise, if central banks had taken the signals coming from strong monetary 
and credit growth more seriously, monetary policy might have better contained the 
build-up of these financial imbalances that ultimately led to the financial crisis (Bini 
Smaghi, 2010). Let us now turn to these arguments. 
 
• First, as regards the 1996-2006 real-estate cycle in the US mortgage market, Taylor 
(2007) argues that higher short-run interest rates could have slowed the demand for 
housing and moderated the appreciation of home prices eventually. Adrian and Shin 
(2009) point out that a tighter monetary policy might have affected the process of 
balance-sheet expansion, slowing leverage and credit growth. Further, owing to the 
high sensitiveness of leverage and maturity mismatches to small changes in the 
yield curve, the two authors conclude that the profitability of off-balance-sheet 
structures would have been strongly weakened if monetary policy was less 
accommodative (Adrian and Shin, 2008). Likewise, Loisel at al. (2010) show that if 
central banks tighten monetary policy in the early stage of a boom, they likely 
break those forms of herding behaviour that are conducive to asset price bubbles. 
Other recent works (see, for instance, Hoerova et al., 2009) focus on the central 
banks’ communication strategy, arguing that a monetary policy which optimally 
complements risk warnings by a series of small steps of interest rate hikes in the 
boom phase helps cooling down asset prices. 
 
• Secondly, rising pre-emptively interest rates during economic upswings provides 
central banks with more flexibility and room for manoeuvre to offset the disruptive 
effects of an adverse shock. On the one hand, this should mitigate the magnitude of 
the economic contraction and enables the economy a ‘soft landing’ once the bubble 
has begun to dissipate. On the other hand, a pre-emptive increase in key policy rates 
of interest reduces the likelihood that the economy falls into a deflationary trap, by 
averting monetary policy from being overwhelmed by the zero lower bound (ZLB) 
binding constraint, which limits its scope and puts its efficacy at stake. 
 
                                                            
16 De Graeve et al. (2008) provide evidence in favour of the existence of a short-run trade-off between 
price and financial stability, insofar as a monetary policy tightening increases the average probability of 
financial distress of banks. See also Fan and White (2002) for evidence of a trade-off between output 
growth and financial stability, owing to the US personal bankruptcy system. 
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• Thirdly, a LATW policy that responds symmetrically to financial imbalances, 
during both upturns and downturns, eliminates the moral-hazard problem (often 
characterised as ‘Greenspan put’) that arises when central banks are expected to 
intervene solely in the aftermath of a bubble to protect financial markets from the 
unravelling of imbalances. Further, a symmetrical monetary-policy approach allows 
central banks to keep higher interest rates in the growth phase of the business cycle, 
thus discouraging excessive risk-taking.17 As Giavazzi and Giovannini (2010) 
cogently argue in this regard, an asymmetrical monetary policy, which does not 
increase interest rates during economic upturns, to wit, at times when financial 
fragility is building up disguised by economic stability, might unwittingly create 
larger imbalances further ahead and push the economy into a low-interest-rate trap. 
Then, an environment of systematically downward-biased interest rates leads to the 
pursuit of risky strategies and increases the likelihood of financial crises, whose 
occurrence requires in turn low interest rates to keep the fragile financial system 
alive.18 
 
• Fourthly, although it is widely accepted that the central bank must show flexibility 
when acting as a lender of last resort during a financial crisis – supporting price 
stability and financial stability at the same time – the cost of cleaning up financial 
excesses has increased notably over time. This cost is even high, as the economy 
has been long stuck in a low-interest-rate’s equilibrium. 
 
Yet, having analyzed the arguments underpinning a more active role of monetary policy 
in macroeconomic stabilisation as well as the ideology supporting the dominant 
monetary paradigm, both share some elements of truth. With respect to the ‘activist’ 
view, the 2007-8 financial crisis enlightened the need for monetary policy to be more 
symmetrical, that is, leaning against these imbalances whose precipitous unwinding can 
put financial stability at stake. By the same token, an active role of central banks faces 
two major drawbacks. On the one hand, diagnosing financial imbalances in real time 
remains subject to a high degree of uncertainty, and hardly ever reaches a unanimous 
agreement as to whether a policy intervention is warranted. This is even truer insofar as 
we live in a world of Knightian uncertainty, where associating a probability to any tail 
event may be extremely difficult, if not impossible at all. On the other hand, any policy 
intervention that responds discretionarily to emerging imbalances will face huge 
political pressures, especially if inflation is subdued. In this respect, tightening 
monetary policy to preserve financial stability in a more distant future may be hardly 
understandable by market participants, insofar as they do not see the counterfactual. As 
far as the central bank is concerned, it faces the conundrum of being accountable to the 
                                                            
17 The perspective of low interest rates provided by an asymmetrical monetary policy acts as a loss-
insurance for financial institutions, the latter being encouraged to pursue high-risk activities, especially if 
they know to be ‘too big to fail’ (see Panzera and Rossi, 2011). An extensive literature explains the 
channels whereby low interest rates affect risk-taking behavior (on the risk-taking channel of monetary 
policy see Jimenez et al., 2007; Borio and Zhu, 2008; Gambacorta, 2009; Altunbas et al., 2010). 
18 There is compelling evidence that the low-interest-rate trap is nowadays a relevant issue, as many 
advanced market economies that have been seriously hit by the 2007-8 financial crisis face hard 
difficulties in carrying out credible exit strategies. 
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general public of the restrictive policy undertaken in an attempt to avoid the disruptive 
effects of a hypothetical event that has not materialised yet (Trichet, 2011). For these 
reasons, too, monetary policy is not well suited to lean against financial imbalances, at 
least when the latter are sector-specific. Conversely, in an attempt to counter financial 
imbalances and deal with the build-up of emerging systemic risks, we favour the 
adoption of a flexible rule-based approach, which is consistent with both ‘conventional’ 
and ‘activist’ views. More precisely, it is crucial that inflation-targeting central banks 
complement their conventional monetary policy arsenal by a number of macro-
prudential tools, which can be used to constrain overly credit growth during economic 
booms. Let us elaborate on this in the next section. 
 
 
4  Some policy proposals 
 
As the previous section has pointed out, proponents of the ‘activist’ view consider the 
unwinding of financial imbalances as the key threat to financial stability and, 
accordingly, call for an overhaul of the major responsibilities of central banks. Beyond 
fostering price stability over the medium to long run, assessing the stance of monetary 
policy requires central banks to give greater weight to the potential risks for financial 
stability stemming from imbalances that build up silently during economic booms. 
 
While reaffirming the centrality of price stability as the overriding goal of monetary 
policy, the post-crisis debate within the economics profession is centred on how, rather 
than whether, inflation targeting should be rethought in order to reconcile price stability 
with financial stability, in such a manner not to throw the baby out with the bath water. 
As Mishkin (2010) argues in this regard, albeit the support for flexible inflation 
targeting regimes has not been weakened by the 2008 crisis, some details concerning its 
conduct need to be rethought. Against the background of rethinking inflation targeting, 
two main proposals for reform19 have emerged. The first proposal, by Blanchard et al. 
(2010), suggests that central banks should allow inflation rates to rise beyond the 
current 2 percent ceiling in normal times.20 According to the same authors, a higher 
inflation target would remove the constraint imposed by the ZLB and gives policy 
makers increased room for manoeuvre to reduce interest rates after an adverse shock hit 
the economy. In particular, the higher inflation expectations, the more the real interest 
rate can be brought down to lower levels when the nominal interest rate approaches the 
ZLB, hence boosting aggregate demand (Mishkin, 2010). 
 
The suggestion of widening the inflation target band has been hardly criticised, 
especially by those economists fearing either a loss of central banks’ credibility or an 
unhinging of inflation expectations. According to our view, and consistently with the 
                                                            
19 To be sure, a third proposal for reform can be found in the literature, arguing that central banks should 
target the price level rather than the inflation rate. For elaboration on this subject matter see Bean et al. 
(2010) and Mishkin (2010). 
20 Reifschneider and Williams (2000) point out that an inflation target rate of 2 percent yearly entails 
frequent episodes of the ZLB constraining monetary policy. Conversely, Bean et al. (2010) provide strong 
arguments against raising the current inflation ceiling. 
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arguments exposed throughout this paper, raising the inflation ceiling misses the point, 
insofar as the issues stemming from the build-up of financial imbalances in good times 
are left unaddressed. Indeed, the proposal by Blanchard et al. (2010) is nothing but an 
ex-post remedy for dealing with the economic disruptions caused by an unexpected 
shock, say, the unravelling of financial imbalances. The reform required for an inflation 
targeting framework to operate successfully should allow central banks to address the 
build-up of financial imbalances early enough (that is, before their unravelling 
jeopardises the stability of the whole system) whilst, at the same time, promoting price 
stability on the market for produced goods and services. As Borio and White (2004) 
note, mutually reinforcing anchors in both the monetary and financial spheres must be 
put in place, so as to reduce the scope for financial imbalances to threaten price stability 
and financial stability. 
 
In an attempt to integrate financial imbalances in the monetary policy framework, a 
second proposal for reform has emerged vigorously after the 2007-8 financial crisis. To 
be sure, the theoretical foundation underpinning this reform dates back to a number of 
works realised in the early 2000s (see, for instance, Bean, 2003; Borio and White, 2004; 
King 2004). These works argue that monetary policy decisions based on forecasts of 
future inflation and output gaps should be implemented on the basis of longer horizons, 
that is to say, beyond the common one-to-three years range adopted by inflation 
targeting regimes.21 Specifically, the authors argue, financial imbalances are accurately 
weighted in the monetary policy decision process, insofar as these imbalances usually 
affect consumer price inflation with considerable lags, not least because of the hazy 
channels involved in the monetary policy transmission mechanism (Bean, 2003). 
Accordingly, central banks should be held responsible for maintaining price stability 
over a longer horizon, say, three or four years. In sum, extending the monetary policy 
horizon allows policy makers to better assess the overall risks to the economic outlook 
posed by the build-up of financial imbalances. This proposal seems a promising step 
towards reconciling price stability with financial stability during periods of economic 
expansion. It suffers, however, from two major shortcomings. First, owing to the 
significant degree of uncertainty embodied in the art of forecasting the key variables 
used to assess monetary policy, lengthening the usual policy horizon over which the rate 
of inflation has to be kept under control increases the uncertainty surrounding monetary 
policy. Against the backcloth of uncertainty, inaccurate forecasts may lead central banks 
to miss inflation targets, jeopardising price (and financial) stability. By then, a central 
bank that, on several occasions, undershoots inflation targets may potentially put its 
credibility at stake, threatening inflation expectations to unhinge. The second concern is 
related to accountability issues. As pointed out by Bean (2003), if the monetary policy 
framework is ill-defined – leaving central banks a high degree of discretion in the 
pursuit of price stability over a given time horizon – then, making a central bank 
accountable for the actions undertaken could be a tricky task. Moreover, in an attempt to 
counter the build-up of financial imbalances through a LATW policy, lengthening the 
monetary policy horizon could make it harder for a central bank to rationalise the choice 
of tightening the stance of monetary policy so as to counter financial imbalances, 
                                                            
21 A precondition for lengthening the policy horizon is that inflation expectations remain well anchored. 
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especially if the rate of inflation is expected to remain below its target for an extended 
period (Borio and White, 2004). 
 
To sum up, while these two proposals for reform have the merit of taking into account 
financial imbalances, both are doomed to not be adopted until better models to forecast 
long-run inflation dynamics and the macroeconomic effects of financial imbalances are 
available. Hence, inflation-targeting central banks should continue to deliver price 
stability within the same operational framework as the one that prevailed prior to the 
2008 crisis, insofar as widening the inflation target band or lengthening the monetary 
policy horizon (or a combination of both) does not effectively reconcile financial 
stability with price stability. By the same token, it is the whole structure of the current 
macrofinancial stability framework, rather than monetary policy per se, that needs to be 
reconsidered afresh. Having, on several occasions, underscored the need to include asset 
prices and credit growth in the monetary policy framework, we argue that, while central 
banks should keep on pursuing medium-run price stability on the market for produced 
goods and services, some complementary macro-prudential tools should be added to the 
central banks’ toolkit.22 Albeit not being a panacea against future financial crises, 
macro-prudential tools are better suited to affect credit growth and, accordingly, 
enhance financial stability. In this respect, the weight put by prudential regulation on 
tackling overly credit growth arises from the close interaction between strong credit 
expansion and soaring asset prices, whose positive feedback loop impinges on financial 
stability negatively. 
 
Nonetheless, some economists fear that extending the scope of central banks’ activities 
beyond price stability undermines the efficacy of monetary policy. Without 
underestimating the strength of the latter argument, the central bank’s toolkit can be 
supplemented with some new macro-prudential tools, without a significant loss of 
monetary policy effectiveness.23 Conversely, by hindering excessive credit growth 
during economic booms, macro-prudential tools lessen the need for monetary policy to 
pre-emptively increase interest rates over the level dictated by inflation. Further, insofar 
as a targeted implementation of macro-prudential tools allows central banks to address 
leverage and credit growth in a calibrated manner, these tools can be implemented so as 
to impinge on specific sectors of the economy (that is, these sectors whose distortions 
pose risks to financial stability). Then, as far as prudential tools have been effectively 
implemented, monetary policy can make its best contribution in the quest of delivering 
price stability.24 
                                                            
22 Insofar as macro-prudential tools pursue the stability of the whole financial system, rather than the 
soundness of its individual components, they represent the first line of defence against financial 
imbalances. Albeit a cost-benefit analysis of concentrating prudential tools in the hands of central banks 
goes beyond the scope of this paper, we support such modus operandi, owing to the strong 
intertwinedness between monetary policy and prudential regulation. 
23 Some important issues arise here, such as the coordination between monetary policy and prudential 
regulation as well as the risk of losing independence if central banks are made accountable for the 
implementation and attainment of macro-prudential goals. 
24 According to Boivin et al. (2010), as far as financial imbalances are sector-specific and well-targeted 
prudential tools exist, monetary policy plays a minor role in dealing with financial imbalances. 
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Against the background of prudential regulation, counter-cyclical capital buffers for 
highly-leveraged systemically-important financial institutions (SIFIs) are the most 
promising tool in the quest of curbing credit expansion. The rationale behind this 
prudential tool is to force SIFIs to raise capital buffers in excess of the minimum 
requirements in good times (for instance, at times when asset prices or the credit to 
GDP ratio are rising faster than their historical growth trend) to be used during 
economic downturns to absorb losses incurred. By then, counter-cyclical capital buffers 
represent an effective tool to prevent massive leveraged positions, whose build-up 
might fuel unsustainable asset price dynamics. Dynamic loan-loss provisions are 
another anti-cyclical macro-prudential tool that forces SIFIs to set aside more capital in 
good times. During the expansion phase of the business cycle, when losses on loans are 
deemed to be (and to remain) low, a provision is charged to account for potential future 
losses. These provisions will be used in bad times to sustain credit growth, precisely 
when institutions are more prone to tighten their lending standards – cutting access to 
credit, even to sound borrowers. Finally, as far as the real-estate market is concerned, 
maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratios constrain the availability of mortgage loans and 
limit the equity portion against which homeowners can borrow. 
 
Despite macro-prudential regulation is a critical step towards preventing financial 
imbalances, it might not be sufficient in every case. For instance, some of the countries 
that put in place prudential measures before the 2007-8 financial crisis in order to 
address excessive domestic credit growth and strengthen the resilience of the banking 
system (for example, the case of Spain with dynamic provisioning) failed to prevent 
boom and bust cycles on local asset markets. Moreover, before the inception of the 
2008 financial turmoil, more than half of the US credit was not generated inside the 
perimeter of the traditional banking system, but within institutions that were subject to 
little or no regulatory oversight (see Guerra and Panzera, 2009). By then, macro-
prudential regulation merely deals with one part of the problem, namely, the part of 
credit kept on the balance sheets of regulated SIFIs. In an attempt to consider the whole 
private credit supplied (that is, within and outside the regulated banking system), it is 
necessary to overtake a purely macro-prudential approach and find a policy tool that, 
albeit preserving some prudential features, addresses with enough precision credit 
growth as a whole. To be effective, this policy tool should act as an automatic stabiliser 
of credit growth and, accordingly, smooth asset price movements. 
 
Against this background, a counter-cyclical tax on debt, as the one proposed by Jeanne 
(2008), is the most promising solution to curtail credit expansion, so as to encompass 
institutions outside the regulated perimeter. Deeming higher credit expansion a source 
of systemic risk, this counter-cyclical tax internalises the negative externalities induced 
by overly debt creation during periods of economic stability – at times when the 
optimism about the economic outlook lulls both lenders and borrowers into 
complacency, neglecting the risks associated with over-indebtedness. According to the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Conversely, as far as imbalances have spilled over to the entire economy and/or prudential tools are broad 
based, monetary policy likely has a role to play and needs to be coordinated with prudential regulation. 
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‘polluter-payer’ principle, the rationale underlying the counter-cyclical tax is to collect a 
progressive tax to be paid by lenders on every new private debt issued at times when the 
growth of private credit has overtaken a predetermined critical threshold. Let us assume, 
for instance, that a year-over-year growth rate of the ratio of private sector credit to 
GDP equal to, say, 3 percent, is judged consistent with price stability and moderate 
economic growth. Then, the more the ratio of private sector credit to GDP overtakes 
this threshold, the higher will be the tax levied on private lending. Hence, a higher tax 
discourages over-indebtedness, ensuring at the same time that credit growth does not 
fuel unsustainable asset booms. As far as the real-estate market is concerned, variations 
in the amount of mortgage interest rate deductions could be considered (Posen, 2009). 
Accordingly, if the private credit to GDP ratio is raising faster (slower) than the level 
judged consistent with the mandate, the amount of mortgage interest rate deductions 
allowed on personal income taxes is reduced (increased). In sum, variations of mortgage 
interest rate deductions act as an automatic stabiliser for housing prices. 
 
Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, it is correct to recognise that not all asset 
price bubbles are credit-induced and associated with emerging systemic risks. Against 
the backcloth of irrational bubbles, other policy measures are worth of being considered. 
In the real-estate market, these measures include levying a tax on the debt principal or 
interests; raising the minimum down payment for second-home buyers (that is, lowering 
the LTV ratio for those borrowers who already possess a home); or, more indirectly, 
extending the length of time before a homeowner is legally allowed to sell his/her 
property.25 As far as the equity market is concerned, raising margin requirements for 
stock purchases, under certain circumstances, might represent a helpful tool in the hands 
of central banks to address any speculative frenzy, without impacting negatively on the 
whole economy.26 
 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
Rapid credit expansion has often been a harbinger of asset bubbles, whose bust has 
caused financial crises to become increasingly frequent. The onset of the financial crisis 
in 2007 has exemplified that credit developments are, nowadays, the key driving force 
in generating and amplifying business cycles. Accordingly, if credit aggregates are 
allowed to rise excessively without being properly counteracted, they could breed waves 
of excessive optimism and set off unsustainable asset price dynamics. This has led some 
economists to rethink the pre-crisis dominant monetary paradigm, according to which 
monetary policy should clean but not lean against asset bubbles – be they credit driven 
                                                            
25 Some of these measures have recently been implemented in Asia (especially in China, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore) to contrast the sharp appreciation of domestic house prices. Although it is too early to draw a 
firm conclusion, these measures appear to be effective in cooling down house price increases. 
26 The manipulation of margin requirements remains a controversial subject within central banks. 
According to Greenspan (2002), there is little evidence that higher margin requirements affect financial 
market conditions in a manner to dampen financial speculation, unless higher margin requirements are 
followed by an increase in short-run interest rates. 
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or not. These economists point out that central banks, as guardians of overall financial 
stability, should pay closer attention to asset market bubbles and actively counteract 
them through a tighter monetary policy. Yet, even after the 2007-8 financial crisis, the 
conventional wisdom is that the interest rate remains too blunt a policy tool to deal with 
asset price dynamics. As far as asset market bubbles are induced by overly credit 
growth, this paper has shown that the adoption of a range of prudential tools is a critical 
but insufficient step. To dispose of the systemic risk stemming from excessive credit 
growth during periods of economic stability, both within and outside the perimeter of 
the traditional banking system, a counter-cyclical tax on debt completes the deficiencies 
of macro-prudential regulation. Such a tax is a crucial step to undertake in an attempt to 
both internalise the negative externalities that arise from excessive credit creation and 
reduce the amplitude of financially-driven business cycles. 
 
By the same token, asset market bubbles cannot be avoided in the future. As Rosengren 
(2011) cogently points out, every historical episode of speculative frenzy has been 
justified by a different financial myth – first held by most market participants, and then 
discarded by the crowd when financial euphoria dries up. Accordingly, this is no time 
for complacency. The economic history has (or should have) taught us that, sooner or 
later, perhaps at that very moment when we feel sheltered from financial crises and we 
believe capable of dominating any instability, we are forced to deal with its invincible, 
destructive forces. 
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